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The California Dignitary Interest:
Procedural Due Process and The
Probationary Employee
That court best serves the law which recognizes that the rules of
lav which grew up in a remote generation may-in the fullness of
experience be found to serve another generation badly, and which
discards the old rule when it finds that another rule of law represents
what should be according to the .. . settled judgment of society.
. ..It is thus great writers upon the common law have discovered
the source and method of its growth, and in its growth found its
health and life. . . .Change of this character should not be left
to the legislature.'
When an individual is employed by the government, a probationary
period may be required during which evaluation for advancement to
permanent status occurs.2 Throughout this probationary period, the
government employer has a generally recognized ability to terminate
the probationary employee without affording the employee a hearing.3
Additionally, the employer is not required to formulate judicially
cognizable good cause in support of the decision to terminate.' The
employer's broad authority to decide when and why the probationary
employee should be terminated is a result of judicial construction of
the due process clauses of the United States Constitution.
Procedural due process under the fourteenth amendment imposes
limitations on the methods used by the government only when depriving
an individual of a protected interest.5 An "interest" 6 is protected under
the fourteenth amendment, in the context of government employment,
under the due process concepts of "liberty" or "property."
1. See Dwy v. Connecticut Company, 89 Conn. 79, 92 A. 883, 891 (1915).
2. The term "government," as used in this comment, includes state, local, and municipal
entities.
3. See Lubey v. City and County of San Francisco, 98 Cal. App. 3d 340, 345, 159 Cal.
Rptr. 440, 443 (1979).
4. See Bogacki v. Board of Supervisors, 5 Cal. 3d 771, 783, 489 P.2d 537, 545, 97 Cal.
Rptr. 657, 665 (1971).
5. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972).
6. An "interest" includes any benefit, tangible or intangible, conferred or created by
the government. See Roth 408 U.S. at 569-70. Although the United States Supreme Court noted
in Roth that the range of interests protected by procedural due process is not infinite, existence
of the interest itself is not predicated on classification under traditional notions of due process
property and liberty. Id.
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A property interest, sufficient to implicate the due process protec-
tions of the fourteenth amendment, is not constitutionally created.7
The property interest is established when existing rules or regulations,
stemming from an independent source such as state law, secure the
interest and support a legitimate claim of entitlement to the interest.'
Under the fourteenth amendment, however, the state may divest the
interest of its status as "property." 9 The state may specify, contrary
to existing rules or understandings, that application of the interest
is subject to the complete discretion of the governmental official in
charge of administration.1" Since the individual has no basis to assert
that he has an entitlement to the interest, the protections afforded under
the fourteenth amendment are inapplicable. 1'
In the context of government employment, the employee has an
interest 2 in continued employment. 3 A legitimate claim of entitle-
ment to continued employment, sufficient to afford the interest the
status of due process property, can be created in various ways. The
claim may be supported pursuant to an employment contract,"4 a
system of tenure," or a clearly implied promise of continued
employment.' 6 The courts, however, have indicated that the status
7. See id. at 576-78.
8. See id.
9. See People v. Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d 260, 266, 599 P.2d 622, 626, 158 Cal. Rptr. 316,
319 (1979).
10. See id. at 266, 599 P.2d at 626, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
11. See id.
12. See 408 U.S. at 569-70.
13. See id. at 578.
14. See Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). In Weiman, the employees were ter-
minated for failing to take a loyalty oath during the term of their employment contract with
the State. While the Court declined to consider whether an abstract right to public employment
exists, it did find that constitutional due process protections extend to a public employee where
exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory. Id. at 192.
15. See Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956). The employee in
Slochower was a teacher with 27 years experience and was entitled to tenure under state law,
which limited discharge to actions constituting "cause", and required notice, hearing and ap-
peal. The employee was discharged under a state law which was interpreted to mean that asser-
tion of the privilege against self-incrimination is equivalent to resignation. Dismissal under the
provision, considered automatic and therefore granting no right to charges, notice, hearing,
or an opportunity to explain, was held to have violated the requirements of due process. Id.
at 554-59.
16. See Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971). In this case, the employee, hired
on January 27, 1969, as a substitute classroom teacher, was dismissed on March 18, 1969, for
refusing to sign a loyalty oath. The Court found failure to sign insufficient cause to allow
summary dismissal from public employment without the hearing or inquiry required by due
process. Id. at 208. See also Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). The employee in Perry
had been employed by the state for 10 years under a series of one year contracts. Though
no formal tenure system was applicable, a de facto tenure system was alleged as arising from
various official employment guidelines promulgated by the employer. The Court, while not
specifically ruling on the allegation, held the absence of explicit contractual provisions did not
foreclose the possibility of a property interest in continued employment arising from implied
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of property which attaches to the permanent employee's interest in
continued employment is not applicable to probationary employees. 7
Since California courts have refused to acknowledge a probationary
employee's interest in continued employment, termination may occur
under the fourteenth amendment without a hearing and in the absence
of judicially cognizable good cause."8
Separate from the issue of a probationary employee's property in-
terest in continued employment is his constitutionally created liberty
interest in the way in which employment termination occurs.' 9
Specifically, the probationary employee has a liberty interest in freedom
from stigmatization of reputation resulting from the method or reasons
for termination.2" Under the fourteenth amendment, the procedural pro-
tections for the probationary employee's liberty interest are not
operative, however, until formal termination proceedings are
instigated. 2' Additionally, the employer is not required to discuss the
reasons for termination except to the extent the reasons may impact
upon the allegation of stigmatization.22 Furthermore, the issue of the
validity of termination, substantively as well as procedurally, is not sub-
ject to judicial review.23
In responding generally to due process analysis under the fourteenth
amendment, the California Supreme Court has concluded that the
traditional methodology employed by the courts impermissibly falls
to protect the values underlying the concept of due process.24 In People
contractual provisions or through an unwritten "commonlaw" that certain employees shall
have the equivalent of tenure. The ability to show, from the circumstances of service or other
relevant facts, that a legitimate claim of re-employment had been created triggered the require-
ment of being informed of the grounds for nonretention and to be afforded the opportunity
to challenge their sufficiency. Id. at 601-04. Cf. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 578.
In Roth, the employee's alleged "property" interest was created and defined by the terms of
his employment. These terms contained a specific termination date, did not provide for con-
tract renewal absent sufficient "cause" or otherwise provide for renewal. The Court found
the terms of appointment gave rise to no protectable interest in continued employment. Addi-
tionally, the employee could point to no state statute, or a rule or policy of the employer
that would support a legitimate claim for reemployment. While the employee was considered
to have an abstract concern in being rehired, the Court declined to find a sufficiently protectable
interest. Id.
17. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 576-80.
18. See id.
19. See id. at 569-74; infra notes 130-92 and accompanying text.
20. See Lubey v. City and County of San Francisco, 98 Cal. App. 3d 340, 346, 159 Cal.
Rptr. 440, 443 (1979); infra notes 130-92 and accompanying text.
21. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 573; infra notes 158-64 and accompanying text.
22. See Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 627 (1977); infra notes 182-92 and accompanying text.
23. See id.
24. See People v. Ramirez, 25. Cal. 3d 260, 266-68, 599 P.2d 622, 626, 158 Cal. Rptr.
316, 320 (1979); infra notes 44-69 and accompanying text.
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v. Ramirez,25 the court held that when the due process clauses of
the California Constitution26 are applied, a separate and specific
acknowledgement of the individual's "dignitary" interest must occur. 27
The dignitary interest simply requires that an individual be informed
of the nature, grounds, and consequences of the actions of the govern-
ment and be able to present his position before a responsible govern-
ment official.28
This comment will demonstrate how the California due process ap-
proach, as articulated in Ramirez, must be applied to termination of
probationary governmental employees. Assuming that greater pro-
cedural protections are constitutionally required under the California
Constitution, this comment will demonstrate how imposition of addi-
tional procedures will have the effect of aligning the substantive nature
of probationary status with that of permanent employees. In developing
the thesis, the comment will first analyze the meaning of the Califor-
nia due process dignitary interest as identified and articulated in
Ramirez.29 After the general requirements of the dignitary interest are
specified,3" the comment will discuss the current rights of probationary
government employees relating to termination procedures.3 Specifically,
the extent of the property and liberty interests enjoyed by probationers
will be delineated.3 2 After identifying the due process rights of pro-
bationary employees under the fourteenth amendment, the requirements
of the California dignitary interest will be applied and possible ef-
fects examined.33
25. See 25 Cal. 3d 260, 599 P.2d 622, 158 Cal. Rptr. 316 (1979).
26. CAL. CoNsT. art. I, §§7(a), 15.
27. See Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d at 269, 599 P.2d at 627-28, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
28. See id. While the language of the federal and state due process clauses are substan-
tially similar, the California Due Process Clauses:
• . . are possessed of an independent vitality which, in a given case, may demand
an analysis different from that which would obtain if only the federal standard were
applicable .... [The California Supreme Court sits] as a court of last resort, subject
only to the qualifications that our interpretations may not restrict the guarantees
accorded the national citizenry under the federal charter. In such constitutional ad-
judication, our first referent is California law and the full panoply of rights Califor-
nians have come to expect as their due. Accordingly, decisions of the United States
Supreme Court defining the fundamental rights are persuasive authority to be af-
forded respectful consideration, but are to be followed by California courts only
when they provide no less individual protection than is guaranteed by California law.
Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 764, 557 P.2d 929, 950, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 366 1(1976).
29. 25 Cal. 3d 260, 599 P.2d 622, 158 Cal. Rptr. 316 (1979); see infra notes 50-69 and
accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 50-61 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 75-84, 130-52 and accompanying text.
32. Id.
33. See infra notes 85-129, 153-92 and accompanying text.
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A BEGINNING: People v. Ramirez
In 1970, following adjournment of criminal proceedings and after
being adjudged a narcotic addict or in imminent danger of becoming
a narcotic addict, Lawrence J. Ramirez was committed for treatment
in the California Rehabilitation Center (CRC).34 In 1974, Ramirez
achieved outpatient status. 3" Two years later, after being arrested and
pleading guilty to a charge of disturbing the peace, Ramirez was found
to be "not a fit subject for confinement or treatment" in the CRC
by the Director of Corrections. 6 The trial court, after a hearing on
the propriety of the exclusion order, upheld the Director's exercise
of discretion." Ramirez's CRC commitment was terminated and the
criminal proceedings were resumed.38
The only procedural protections Ramirez received before exclusion
were those required by the CRC regulations. 39 These limited procedures
included the right to receive a copy of the regional administrator's
letter recommending exclusion and to be informed of the right to
appeal the recommendation through direct correspondence to the
regional administrator.4 °
The California Supreme Court viewed the question presented 4' as
a determination of the procedural protections that are mandated by the
due process clauses of the California Constitution. 2 In analyzing this
question, the court held that the procedures utilized were constitu-
34. See Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d at 264, 599 P.2d at 624, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 318. This action,
occurring after Ramirez was convicted of burglary and possession of heroin arose pursuant
to Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code Section 3051 which states: ". . . upon conviction of a defendant
. . . and upon imposition of sentence, if it appears to the judge that the defendant may be
addicted . . . the judge shall suspend execution of the sentence and order the district attorney
to file a petition for commitment of the defendant to the Director of Corrections for confine-
ment in the . . . [C.R.C.]. .... "
35. See id. at 264, 599 P.2d at 624, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 318.
36. See id. Ramirez's termination occurred when the Director of Corrections exercised his
discretion under Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code Section 3053(a): "If at any time . . . the Director of
Corrections concludes that the person, because of excessive criminality or for other relevant
reason, is not a fit subject for confinement or treatment . . . he shall return the person to
the court . . . for such . . . further proceedings on the criminal charges .... " (emphasis
added). Id.
37. See Ramirez, 25 Cal. 2d at 264, 599 P.2d at 624, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 318.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 276, 599 P.2d at 632-33, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
40. Though Ramirez had the right to these procedures under the CRC regulations, the
CRC failed to inform him of his right to appeal so he could take advantage of these limited
protections. Additionally, Ramirez was not granted access to information considered by the
Director in making the exclusion order, nor was he afforded the opportunity to respond orally
before a responsible governmental official. See id.
41. The case reached the California Supreme Court on appeal from an order granting proba-
tion and from a judgment and exclusion order entered in the trial court. See id. at 264-65, 599
P.2d at 624-25, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 318.
42. See CA. CONST. art. I, §§7(a), 15. As opposed to the Due Process Clauses of the
United States Constitution (5th and 14th amendments), the California Due Process Clauses
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tionally insufficient. 3 As a result, the court firmly established the
separate identity of procedural due process under the California
Constitution.
Procedural due process, though an elastic concept, incorporates cer-
tain recognized principles.4" Accordingly, the United States Supreme
Court has acknowledged that protection against arbitrary governmental
action is the "touchstone of due process." ' Included within the fun-
damental values underlying due process is the promotion of accuracy
and reasonable predictability in governmental decision making.4 Under
the approach taken by the United States Supreme Court, "interests"
derived from nonconstitutional sources such as state law are not always
considered to be within the scope of due process protections.47 When
the source of the "interest" is not constitutional, due process under
the United States Constitution is mandatory only when the govern-
ment has imposed specific limitations on how or why deprivation of
the "interest" may occur.48 Alternatively, when deprivation of the
"interest" is subject to the uncontrolled discretion of the government,
fourteenth amendment due process protections are considered
inapplicable.49
Although the approach followed by the United States Supreme Court
in interpreting the federal due process clause was used as a basis for
analysis, the California Supreme Court in Ramirez declined to adopt
that approach and its underlying reasoning."0 In the opinion of the
relate specifically to civil proceedings [Art. I, §7 (a)] and criminal proceedings (Art. I, §
15). The California Supreme Court, however, based its analysis on both clauses. In so doing,
the court, by clear implication, held the mandates of both due process clauses equal at least
insofar as the procedural protections arising under the clauses are concerned. See Ramirez,
25 Cal. 3d at 263-64, 599 P.2d at 624, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 318.
43. See Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d at 263-64, 599 P.2d at 624, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 318.
44. See id.
45. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974); Cf. Gonzales v. Freeman, 334 F.2d
570, 574 (D.C. Cir. 1964). Chief Justice (then Judge) Burger, in discussing how determination
of a "right" may resolve the question of justiciability, stated: ". . . of course there is no right;
but that does not mean the government can act arbitrarily, either substantively or procedurally,
against a person, or that such person is not entitled to challenge the processes. .. .
46. See Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d at 267, 599 P.2d at 626, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
47. In Ramirez, the California Supreme Court found the language of Welf. & Inst. Code
Section 3053 to impose some limitations on the exercise of discretion. Because the circumstances
under which exclusion could occur are conditioned by the terms of the statute, under the four-
teenth amendment the patient-inmate's interest is considered within the scope of due process
liberty and is thus subject to some degree of procedural protections. See id. at 265-66, 599
P.2d at 626, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
48. See id. at 265-66, 599 P.2d at 626, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
49. See id. at 266, 599 P.2d at 626, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 119-20. The court noted further
that the ability of the state to foreclose applications of due process protections under the four-
teenth amendment is determined irrespective of the extent of grievous loss or substantial adverse
impact. Id. [citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976) and Montanye v. Haymes,
427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976)].
50. The California Supreme Court focused its analysis on statutorily created liberty in-
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Ramirez court, the approach used by the United States Supreme Court
fails to fully effectuate procedural due process values.5" In addition
to the need for reliability in governmental decision-making, the court
identified an ".... important due process interest in recognizing the
dignity and worth of the individual by treating him as an equal, fully
participating and responsible member of society."51 2 To the California
Supreme Court, this dignitary interest must be recognized under the
California Constitution because of the lack of acknowledgement that
interest is accorded under the fourteenth amendment.53
The ramifications of the dignitary interest are separate and distinct
from the interests created by statute. 4 The dignitary interest arises
independently from the California Constitution." Analysis of the
dignitary interest occurs in the context that freedom from arbitrary
adjudicative procedures is a substantive element of an individual's
liberty. 6 An additional presumption follows recognition of the dignitary
interest. The individual always is presumed to have a due process in-
terest in fair and unprejudiced decision-making and in being treated
with respect and dignity. 7 Regardless of the "interest" subjected to
deprivatory action, the language used by the Ramirez court establishes
an independent basis for due process protections triggered whenever
the government becomes involved.5"
terests. The approach under the fourteenth amendment which the court uses as a basis for
its discussion is equally applicable to property interests which, as opposed to liberty interests
that may arise independently from the constitution, are only created from sources such as state
law. See Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d at 263-69, 599 P.2d at 624-28, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 318-21; Board
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577-78 (1979).
51. See Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d at 267-68, 599 P.2d at 626, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 319-20.
52. Id.; cf. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 233 (1976). Justice Stevens, dissenting, stated:
.. if the inmate's protected liberty interest are no greater than the State chooses to allow,
he is really little more than the slave described in the 19th century cases. I think it clear that
even the inmate retains an unalienable interest in liberty - at the very minimum the right to
be treated with dignity - which the constitution may never ignore." Id. (emphasis added).
53. See id. at 263-69, 599 P.2d at 624-28, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 318-21.
54. See id. at 267, 599 P.2d at 626-27, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 320-21.
55. See id.
56. Later decisions of the California Supreme Court have clarified the nature of this interest:
...the dissent applies in the Ramirez framework of analysis to evalute the substan-
tive sufficiency of the statutory provisions.... Such use is a misapplication of Ramirez,
a procedural due process case, and evidences a fundamental misunderstanding of the
issue addressed by this court.... This court is not determining what kinds of substan-
tive . . . procedures should be available. Rather, this court is reviewing the constitu-
tional sufficiency of the procedures used to administer the existing statutory scheme.
Van Atta v. Scott, 27 Cal. 3d 424, 434 n.7, 613 P.2d 210, 214 n.7, 166 Cal. Rptr.
149, 153 n.7 (1980) (emphasis added).
57. See Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d at 268, 599 P.2d at 626, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 320-21.
58. See id. While the focus of the opinion of the court was the protection of an individual's
statutory interests, the language quoted is sufficiently broad to encompass deprivatory govern-
mental actions directed at an individual's constitutionally created interests. Furthermore, there
is some indication that the dignitary interest will have an effect upon deprivatory governmental
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Recognition of the dignitary interest requires that application of
procedural protections be determined in the context of the individual's
due process interest in freedom from arbitrary adjudicative practices. 9
The dignitary interest analysis does not start with an attempt to classify
the "interest" as within the concepts of "liberty" or "property." 60
Instead, constitutionally required procedural protections are assessed
in the context of whatever governmental and private interests are at
stake.6
Incorporation of the dignitary interest into a due process analysis
creates a substantial difference between the approaches under the
California and United States Constitutions. The California approach
presupposes that procedural due process safeguards will be operative
when deprivatory governmental action is threatened, and focuses on
the procedures that are necessary under the particular circumstances.62
Under the United States Constitution, an inquiry into the nature of
the procedural protections that are required is irrelevant prior to a
determination that procedural protections are in fact applicable.63
The distinction between the two approaches is reflected in the con-
siderations specified by the Ramirez court for use when identifying
the dictates of due process.64 Contrary to the approach under the
actions even where there is no other recognized private interest historically subject to procedural
protections:
[E]ven in cases in which the decision making procedure will not alter the outcome
of governmental action, due process may nevertheless require that certain procedural
protections be granted the individual in order to protect important dignitary values,
or, in other words, 'to insure that the method of interaction itself is fair in terms
of what are perceived as minimum standards of political accountability - of modes
of interaction which express a collective judgment that human beings are important
in their own right, and that they must be treated with understanding, respect, and
even compassion'. Id. (emphasis added).
59. See id. at 263-64, 599 P.2d at 624, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 318.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 571:
• . . the requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of
interests encompassed by the fourteenth amendment's protection of liberty and prop-
erty . . . [A] weighing process has long been a part of any determination of the
form of hearing required in particular situations by procedural due process. But,
to determine whether due process requirements apply in the first place, we must not
look to the "weight" but to the nature of the interest at stake. We must look to
see if the interest is within the fourteenth amendment's protection of liberty and
property. Id. (emphasis added).
64. See Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d at 269, 599 P.2d at 627-28, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 321. By identi-
fying the need to establish the extent to which due process relief will be available, the court
recognized that due process safeguards cannot be established with any substantial degree of
rigidity. Id. See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972), ". . . due process is
flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands."; and
Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979):
The function of legal process, as that concept is embodied in the Constitution, and
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United States Constitution, the individual's dignitary interest in be-
ing informed of the nature, grounds, and consequences of govern-
mental actions is explicitly protected." Additionally, the government
must recognize the individual's interest in responding to the govern-
mental assertions before a responsible and impartial official. 66
Aside from the specific identification and inclusion of the dignitary
interest, the considerations that comprise the "tests" for determining
due process requirements under the California and United States Con-
stitutions are identical.67 Separate and distinct recognition of the in-
dividual's dignitary interest, however, requires some procedural pro-
tections in every case." Only by balancing the individual's specific
dignitary interest against the other articulated considerations can the
proper determination of procedural requirements be made. 9
A determination of procedural due process requirements in a given
situation is only necessary, however, when an individual is deprived
in the realm of factfinding, is to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions. Because
of the broad spectrum of concerns to which the term must apply, flexibility is necessary
to gear the process to the particular need; the quantum and quality of the process
due in a particular situation depends upon the need to serve the purpose of minimiz-
ing the risk of error.
Id. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970): "The opportunity to be heard must
be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard." Id.
65. See Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d at 269, 599 P.2d at 627-28, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
66. See id.
67. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
68. As opposed to the procedural concerns that the dignitary interest represents, the private
and governmental interests are shaped by the circumstances of the particular situation. Alter-
natively, those circumstances will effect what procedures are necessary to fulfill the requirements
of the dignitary interest, rather than shaping the interest itself. See Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d at
269, 599 P.2d at 627-28, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
69. See id. Subsequent California decisions have not been consistent in recognizing the
impact of Ramirez or even the identification of the dignitary interest. The California Supreme
Court has specifically utilized the Ramirez framework, and more particularly application of
the dignitary interest, in reviewing the constitutional sufficiency of procedures used to administer
existing statutory schemes. See In Re Winnetka, 28 Cal. 3d 587, 592-94, 620 P.2d 163, 168,
169 Cal. Rptr. 713, 717-18 (1980):
Communications . . . made without formal opportunity for response. . . raise the
danger that inaccuracies may affect the decision to rehear. The right to respond enables
the minor to point up flaws in the prosecutor's arguments, emphasize favorable por-
tions of the record, and suggest why discretion should be exercised in favor of leav-
ing the referee's decision untouched. . . . Recognition of the right promotes an ap-
pearance of fairness and supports the important dignitary values underlying due process.
Id. See also Van Atta v. Scott, 27 Cal. 3d 424, 434-46 613 P.2d 210, 214-22 166 Cal. Rptr.
149, 153-61 (1980). Some lower courts, in applying the Rameriz test, have also specifically
utilized the dignitary interest as a specific factor. See Inmates of Sybil Brand Inst. v. County
of L.A., 130 Cal. App. 3d 89, 106-09, 181 Cal. Rptr. 599, 608-09 (1982): "Implementation
of the procedures . . . will undoubtedly place some greater administrative burdens on respon-
dent than they concede is the existing procedure. However, this factor does not outweigh the
dignitary interest. . . ." Id. See also In Re Albright, 129 Cal. App. 3d 504, 510-11, 181 Cal.
Rptr. 84, 88 (1982). Other lower courts, while citing to Ramirez and purporting to apply its
test, have failed to recognize the independent nature of the dignitary interest. See e.g., People
v. Superior Court of Mono, 110 Cal. App. 3d 396, 401-03, 168 Cal. Rptr. 21, 24 (1980). Fur-
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of "life, liberty or property. ' 7 0 Since an individual does not have
a recognized "right" to governmental employments procedural due
process guarantees were at one time considered inapplicable. 7" This
position has been almost completely abandoned by the United States
Supreme Court.3 The status of a probationary governmental employee,
when compared with that of a permanent employee, is still not
recognized as giving rise to the protections identified by the Ramirez
court as necessary to protect an individual's dignitary interest. 74 The
following discussion will examine the status of probationary govern-
mental employment, and through application of Ramirez, demonstrate
how the nature of probationary status in California should change.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND THE PROBATIONARY EMPLOYEE
Procedural due process guarantees are not an established factor in
determining the way in which many governmental employment ac-
tions must be structured. 5 Application of due process protections is
neither uniform nor static.76 Differing standards govern the type of
thermore, there are decisions which, in discussing what type of procedures are required under
the California Due Process Clauses, utilized the federal approach and disregarded the California
approach articulated in Ramirez. See Boussard v. Regents of University of California, 131 Cal.
App. 3d 636, 638-42, 184 Cal. Rptr. 460, 461-62 (1982).
70. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V, XIV; CA. CONsT. art. I, §§7(a), 15.
71. "Governmental employment" as used in this comment refers to state, local, and
municipal employees.
72. See Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided
court, 341 U.S. 118 (1951). The District Court specifically refuted the notion of governmental
employment as "property," and could not perceive how employment could be construed as
"liberty." Id. at 57. See also Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 451 (1954); Adler
v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952). This historical determination found the status
of "public employee" was one that had been granted by the government as a matter of "grace"
and could therefore be withdrawn at the pleasure of the states absent statutory restrictions.
Compare Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 149-56 (1974) (where the United States Supreme
Court traced the history of federal employment from a system of patronage through enactment
of subsequent civil service legislation) with Skelly v. State Personnel Board, 15 Cal. 3d 194, 201-05,
539 P.2d 774, 124 Cal. Rptr. 14, 19-22 (1975) (where the California Supreme Court described
the California system of civil service employment).
73. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 n.9 (1972); see also Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1970). The United States Supreme Court rejected the concept
that existence of constitutional rights turn upon whether the governmental benefit in question
can be characterized as a r'ight" or "privilege." Rejection of this distinction stems from Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970), where the Court declined to answer a constitutional challenge
to the termination of governmental benefits by classifying the benefit as a "privilege" and
not a "right." Recognizing the traditional common law concepts of property are inadequate
to encompass the existing forms of "rights," the Court found that to view welfare entitlements
as "property" rather than a "gratuity" was more realistic. Id.
74. See infra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
75. See generally Skelly v. State Board, 15 Cal. 3d 194, 539 P.2d 774, 124 Cal. Rptr.
14 (1975). (Application of procedural due process to permanent civil source employees.).
76. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1975).
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procedures necessary, depending on the type of due process interest
involved. In the context of governmental employment, the due pro-
cess interest involved may be either a "liberty" or "property" interest. 77
A. The Property Interest
Compared with permanent employees, probationary employees
78
historically have been afforded lesser protection both statutorily and
under due process analysis. 79 This difference in treatment results from
a refusal by the courts to recognize in the probationer the due pro-
cess property interest in continued employment that is vested in per-
manent employees. 80 Unless the terms of employment specify other-
wise, a probationary employee therefore is considered subject to
removal without a hearing or judicially cognizable good cause."
The judiciary is reluctant to support any inference that creates a
probationer's property interest in continued employment." The govern-
77. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 572-79.
78. "Probation" is defined as the action of subjecting an individual to a period of testing
so as to be able to ascertain the individual's fitness or lack of fitness for a particular job.
See VEisER's TmRD NEav INTERNAIONAL DICTIONARY, 1806 (1976). A probationary employee,
as opposed to a temporary employee or employee at will, is generally governed by a civil ser-
vice statutory scheme. See Bell v. Duffy, IIl Cal. App. 3d 643, 649-50, 168 Cal. Rptr. 753,
756-57 (1980). Under civil service statutory schemes, successful completion of the probationary
period results in achieving permanent employment status. Id. While the focus of the comment
is the procedural due process rights of probationary public employees, the principles are ap-
plicable to temporary employees, employees at will, and administrative level employees; accord
Comment, Due Process for Public School Administrators? 9 PAC. L.J. 921 (1978):
While the need for agency discretion in maintaining promotional-level personnel in
positions requiring group cooperation and concerted action [exists] . . . . there is
no discernible state interest in denying the administrator a right to an orderly, fun-
damentally fair exercise of that discretion. On the other hand, the interests of the
individual employee are clearly threatened, as a practical matter, by unexplained ter-
minations of his ... promotional level status. The legislative introduction of procedural
safeguards . . . will foster both the interest of the individual in maintaining some
control over his . . . professional life free from arbitrary state interference, and the
interest of the state. . . . Id. at 947.
79. See Bogacki v. Board of Supervisors, 5 Cal. 3d 771, 489 P.2d 537, 97 Cal. Rptr.
657 (1971); see also Kestier v. City of Los Angeles, 81 Cal. App. 3d 62, 146 Cal. Rptr. 61
(1978). Essentially, a probationary employee is considered on "trial" for the duration of his
probationary period. The trial period serves the purpose of disclosing an employee's attributes
which are not ascertainable at the time of initial employment. "Observation of an employee
during that period may disclose things about his character, personality, and efficiency not
discoverable at the time of original employment." Id. at 65, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 63. These at-
tributes are distinguishable from objectively provable acts of misconduct; and are considered
to require expert evaluation by the employee's supervisors. As a result, the essentials of proba-
tionary evaluation, the right and power to weigh not only proven acts of misconduct but more
subtle matters of character and judgment, and the discretion to act on presumed expertise in
deciding whether the probationary employee should obtain the status of permanent employee,
are vested in the administrative official. Id.
80. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 575-80.
81. See id.
82. See id.
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ment, as an employer, must have broad discretion in determining which
employees will be retained.8 3 Citing considerations of "comity" and
"administrative efficiency," courts have refrained from attempting
to substitute their judgment for that of the responsible governmental
official." While the fourteenth amendment imposes no limitations on
dismissals of probationers without cause under a "property" interest
analysis, the California due process clause, as interpreted in Ramirez,
requires a different method of analysis.
1. The Probationer, Property, and Dignity
Under the California Constitution, when a person is deprived of
83. See id.
84. See Rosenfield v. Malcolm, 65 Cal. 559, 562-63, 421 P.2d 697, 699, 55 Cal. Rptr.
505, 507 (1967); see also Kestler v. City of Los Angeles, 81 Cal. App. 3d 62, 146 Cal. Rptr.
61 (1978). The courts have acknowledged, in the area of the probationary employee's com-
petence, the employer's use of "expert evaluation." Id. at 66, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 63. Accord
Bojacki v. Board of Supervisors, 5 Cal. 3d 771, 489 P.2d 537, 97 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1971). The
court indicated the employer's power to remove for cause satisfactory to himself would become
chimerical if he would be required to accept as an employee one whom he personally con-
sidered incompetent solely because the trial court disagreed with him. Id. at 782 n.12, 489
P.2d at 545, n.12, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 665 n.12. Absence of a protectable property interest does
not mean the requirements and protections of due process are inapplicable. Even though the
courts have allowed the employer to take disciplinary action without requiring judicially cognizable
good cause, the employer is still precluded from acting on the "wrong" cause. See generally
Healdsburg P.O.A. v. City of Healdsburg, 57 Cal. App. 3d 444, 129, Cal. Rptr. 216 (1976);
Bekiaris v. Board of Education, 6 Cal. 3d 575, 493 P.2d 480, 100 Cal. Rptr. 16 (1972). An
employee may not be discharged for validly exercising organizational or representational rights,
whether stemming from a statute affording public employees the right to join labor organiza-
tions, or arising from the first and fourteenth amendments. Compare Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1972) with Rosenfield v. Malcolm, 65 Cal. 2d at 562, 421 P.2d at 699,
55 Cal. Rptr. at 507. The employer is precluded from basing the employment action on an
employee's political activities, or attitude toward a political movement, unless the activities
impermissibly interfere with the employee's work. Cf. Hollon v. Pierce, 257 Cal. App. 468,
64 Cal. Rptr. 808 (1967). An investigation of competence will not be tolerated when it cloaks
a prohibited inquiry into unorthodox beliefs or an act of religious bias. Alternatively, a non-
discriminatory regulation of conduct for a proper public objective not forbidden by the guarantee
of free belief even though the regulation indirectly affects religious activities. Id. at 477, 64
Cal. Rptr. at 814. These limitations are some evidence of the reluctance of the court to vest
total and unsupervised discretion in the employer. These constraints are viewed narrowly to
arise when constitutional, or specific statutory rights, are involved. Various commentators,
however, have asserted a less dramatic rationale for affording nonpermanent employees greater
protections.
Justice Marshall, dissenting in Roth, expressed his view that every citizen who applies for
a government job is entitled to it unless the government can establish some reason for denying
employment. This is the "property" right that the Justice believes to be protected by the four-
teenth amendment. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 588.
In Kestler, Judge Jefferson vigorously dissented from the majority opinion. While conceding
that probationaries do not have the same rights as permanent employees, he stressed that this
does not mean the probationary employee has no right against an arbitrary, capricious, and
unreasonable ground for termination. The Judge, by requiring termination to occur in good
faith with an absence of purely arbitrary and capricious action, and after balancing the proba-
tionary employee's sterling record against one act of negligence occurring off duty, would have
held the termination was an abuse of the employer's discretion. See Kestler, 81 Cal. App.
3d at 67-69, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 64-65.
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a statutorily conferred benefit, due process analysis starts with an
assessment of the procedural protections required in light of the private
and governmental interests at stake. 5 All employees, permanent and
probationary, have a "private" interest in continued employment. 6
The lrobationer's interest in continued employment, however, is not
viewed as a due process "property" interest.87 Nevertheless, the pro-
bationer is not completely without due process protections when
deprived of governmental employment. When the probationer is depriv-
ed of his employment position, his dignitary interest becomes
involved.8 Separate from the probationer's interest in the fact of
employment, is his dignitary interest in freedom from arbitrary ad-
judicative procedures, fair and unprejudiced decision-making, and
in being treated with respect and dignity.89
When deprivation of employment occurs, failure to require a state-
ment establishing judicially cognizable good cause9" or a meaningful
hearing is the essence of arbitrary adjudicative practice.9 The lack
of procedural requirements before termination also tends to erode the
settled proposition that a person cannot be removed from public
employment for exercising constitutional rights unless the government
can point to a compelling reason for termination. 92 To protect the
85. See Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d at 263-64, 599 P.2d at 624, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 318.
86. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 577-78.
87. See id.
88. See Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d at 268, 599 P.2d at 627, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 276, 599 P.2d at 632, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 326. (citing Rabin, Job Security
and Due Process: Monitoring Administrative Discretion Through a Reasons Requirement, 44
U. Cm. L. REv. 60, 77-78 (1976):
Fundamental to the concept of procedural due process is the right to reasoned ex-
planation of governmental conduct that is contrary to the expectations the govern-
ment has created by conferring a special status upon the individual. The very essence
of arbitrariness is to have one's status redefined by the state without an adequate
explanation of its reasons for doing so. . . . [Tihe respect for individual autonomy
that is at the foundation of procedural due process imposes a distinct obligation
upon the government to explain fully its adverse status decision." Id.
91. While the opportunity for oraf participation may not be required in every hearing,
: ..oral participation may be useful in resolving conflicting information and in the
introduction of subjective factors into the decision making process that might other-
wise not be considered; it thereby may often tend to enhance the accuracy and reliability
of the .. .decision. And even in cases in which such participation is unlikely to
affect the outcome of the decision, it nevertheless promotes imporant due process
dignitary values that underlie due process. See Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d at 275, 599 P.2d
at 631-32, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 325 (emphasis added)).
92. By allowing the employer the unfettered discretion to dismiss an employee, the possibility
that such discretion will be utilized to cloak a discharge based on unconstitutional grounds
becomes apparent. Additionally, without a requirement on the employer to furnish reasons
for termination, the employee faces an intolerable task to establish what actually motivated
the employer who may terminate for no reason at all. See Bogacki, 5 Cal. 3d at 798, 489
P.2d at 556, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 676. (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
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probationary employee's dignitary interest, current doctrine should be
modified to acknowledge and implement the requirements of a hear-
ing and a statement of the reasons for termination.
The full implications of protecting a probationary employee's due
process dignitary interest may be far greater than the mere imposi-
tion of additional procedural safeguards. The employer is required
to formulate and articulate with some degree of specificity the grounds
for termination. 93 The probationer becomes justified in believing his
employment will continue absent the existence of specific grounds for
termination.9" Over a period of time, reasons underlying the prior
terminations will become implied terms of employment. 9 The employer
may not substantially deviate from his previously articulated reasons
for termination without "breaching" the implied terms of
employment.96 Since the probationer will have a legitimate expecta-
tion that his position will continue in the absence of the established
reasons for termination, a due process property interest in continued
employment is created. 97
Protection of a probationary employee's dignitary interest requires
substantially similar procedures to those necessary for the protection
of a permanent employee's due process property interest. As opposed
to situations involving a property interest, however, the focus of the
"principle that freedom from arbitrary adjudicative procedures is a
substantive element of one's liberty"98 is solely a determination of
procedural protections.99 Only after a property interest has been created
by complying with the requirements of the dignitary interest is the
outcome, or substance, of the employer's decision affected.' 0 Recogniz-
ing a property interest does not, however, entitle the employee to con-
tinued employment.' 1 The ability to challenge the sufficiency of the
93. See Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d at 269, 599 P.2d at 627-28, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
94. See Perry, 408 U.S. at 600-02.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d at 268, 599 P.2d at 627, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
99. See Van Atta v. Scott, 27 Cal. 3d at 434 n.7, 613 P.2d at 214 n.7, 166 Cal. Rptr.
at 153 n.7.
100. See Perry, 408 U.S. at 603.
101. As previously indicated, due process analysis under the California Constitution requires
an assessment in light of the governmental as well as private interests at stake. See Ramirez,
25 Cal. 3d at 268, 599 P.2d at 627, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 320. The governmental interest encom-
passes the need to regulate the work force as well as fiscal and administrative burdens that
additional or substitute requirements entail. See Rosenfield v. Malcolm, 65 Cal. 2d 559, 562-63,
421 P.2d 697, 699, 55 Cal. Rptr. 505, 507 (1967); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35
(1975). For the rationale underlying the nature of probationary status to be effectuated, the
employer's broad exercise of discretionary authority must be recognized. See supra note 79.
While the type of evaluation necessary may not be so readily adaptable to procedural due
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grounds for termination merely allows the probationary employee some
input into the ultimate determination of his employment status.' Fur-
thermore, creating a property interest in continued employment while
the employee is a probationer does not nullify the difference between
"permanent" and "probationary" status. The reasons for termina-
tion necessary to comport with the standard of judicially cognizable
good cause do not have to be identical for both classifications. 103 The
historial "bright line" separating permanent and probationary
employees is substantially blurred, however, after application of the
requirements of the dignitary interest.
The change in the historical meaning of probationary status arises
from requirements of the dignitary interest as found in the Califor-
nia Constitution. Generally, fulfillment of the constitutional re-
quirements involves notice of the employee's actions and underlying
reasons for termination, as well as some type of a hearing.'10 Express
enactments within a legislative scheme can satisfy the purposes behind
acknowledgement of the dignitary interest by the Ramirez court. When
an express procedural provision does not exist, the requirements
underlying the dignitary interest must be incorporated into the
legislative scheme by implication.
2. Necessity of a Dignitary Interest When Statutory
Protections Exist
Not all probationary governmental employees are subject to dismissal
without the procedural protections of a hearing or the requirement
of judicially cognizable good cause.105 Some statutory schemes require
process safeguards as decisions that turn on specific factual questions, whenever an employee
is discharged there should be some reason for the decision. Since it is not procedurally burden-
some to give reasons when reasons exist, a requirement that the reason be communicated to
the person most directly affected by the governmental decision logically follows. See Roth,
408 U.S. at 591-92. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Even though the requirement of specifying
reasons for termination or conducting a hearing may not in itself alter the probationer's tradi-
tional status, and therefore the outcome of the governmental action, compliance with these
general procedural requirements will at least provide protection against arbitrary action. Id.
102. See Perry, 408 U.S. at 602-03.
103. The key to the dignitary interest is to protect the individual against unexplained govern-
mental action. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text. In determining whether the reasons
for termination will constitute judicially cognizable good cause, the purpose of the probationary
period should not be abandoned. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. Procedural
requirements entail utilization of limited governmental resources, and at some point the benefit
to the individual arising from a higher standard or additional safeguards is outweighed by the
cost of providing such protection. See Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv.
1267, 1276-77 (1975).
104. See Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d at 268, 599 P.2d at 627-28, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
105. See infra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 15
that extensive and specific procedures be utilized.' °0 In other job
classifications, the probationary employee may request an investiga-
tion of the reasons underlying termination' °7 or may have a right to
an "administrative appeal" when punitive action is taken by the public
agency. 08 If the statutory scheme imposes specific requirements before
termination may occur, such as defining the grounds upon which the
employer's decision must be based, a "legitimate claim of entitlement"
to the government position has been created. 0 9 Therefore, the pro-
bationary employee's interest can be viewed as a "property" interest
substantially similar to those attached to permanent employees, and
therefore, requiring the procedural protections of the fourteenth
amendment.
Enactment of statutory protections does not render separate
acknowledgement of the individual's dignitary interest meaningless.
The dignitary interest is not a product of statutory construction." '
The probationary employee's interest in being treated with respect and
dignity arises under the California Constitution."' The rationale behind
special identification of this constitutionally based interest is derived
from the major flaw of the approach under the fourteenth
amendment. "1 2
The approach under the fourteenth amendment allows the state to
decide whether procedural due process is applicable any time the "in-
terest" is not constitutionally created." 3 The state may render the
"interest" unprotected through complete and uncontrolled delegation
of administration of the interest to a governmental official."' The
extent to which procedures are to be followed when the state deals
with its citizens in effect, is free from constitutional restrictions." '
The ability of the state to choose to deal with its citizens without
106. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44948. "Governing boards of school districts shall dismiss
probationary employees during the school year for cause only, as in the case of permanent
employees." Id. (emphasis added). See also §44949. This section requires, in part, the board
to give the probationary employee notice that his services will not be required for the ensuing
year. This notice must be tendered by a certain date and the reasons contained therein must
remain confidential unless a hearing is requested by the probationer. Id. §44949a. If a hearing
is requested various procedures are specified including a decision which contains a determina-
tion of the sufficiency of the cause for termination. Id. §44949c. Failure by the board to comply
with the provisions contained within this section may result in the employee's reemployment. Id.
107. See CAL. GOV'T. CODE §§19173, 19175.
108. See CAL. GOV'T. CODE §3304(b).
109. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 576-77.
110. See Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d at 268, 599 P.2d at 627, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
111. See id. at 268, 599 P.2d at 627, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
112. See id. at 267, 599 P.2d at 627, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
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regard to due process standards is unacceptable to the California
Supreme Court. ' 6 The government, as an employer, must modify its
procedures to comply with the due process guidelines set forth in
Ramirez. When the government emloyer strictly adheres to statutory
procedures, the probationary employee's due process dignitary interest
may suffer.
The potential meaninglessness of the statutory "protections,"
rendered insignificant through legislative drafting or judicial construc-
tion, is typified by the procedures afforded probationary employees
under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act." 7 This
Act simply provides that "[n]o punitive action, nor denial of promo-
tion on grounds other than merit, shall be undertaken by any public
agency without providing the public safety officer with an opportunity
for administrative appeal." 8 Under the statute as defined, regularly
employed probationary police officers are entitled to the appeal
process." 9 The Act, however, does not indicate what specific pro-
cedures are required.
As the Act is interpreted, the probationary employee may establish
a formal record of the circumstances surrounding termination.'2 Since
the Act is not construed as preventing the governmental entity from
terminating probationary employees without cause,' 2 ' the "appeal"
to which the probationer is entitled is the antithesis of what may be
considered a meaningful procedure. As the probationary employee can
be terminated at will, judicial review is considered superfluous.' Ac-
cordingly, whether evidence exists to support the employer's decision
to terminate is immaterial. 23 By declining to impose specific re-
quirements within the statutory framework, the California Legislature
116. See id.
117. See CAL. GOV'T. CODE §§3300-3311.
118. See CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 3304(b). "Punitive action" is defined as "... any action which
may lead to dismissal, demotion, suspension, reduction in salary, written reprimand, or transfer
for purposes of punishment." Id. §3303. Additionally, use of the phrase "for purposes of
punishment" is read in the disjunctive to modify only the term "transfer." As such, any of
the aforementioned personnel actions are considered per se disciplinary, punitive in nature so
as to give rise to the requirements of §3304(b). White v. County of Sacramento, 31 Cal. 3d
676, 680-83, 646 P.2d 191, 193-95, 183 Cal. Rptr. 520, 522-24 (1982)..
119. See Barnes v. Personnel Department, 87 Cal. App. 3d 502, 504, 151 Cal. Rptr. 94,
95-96 (1978); see also Allen v. City of Napa, No. 44228 Napa County Superior Court (1982).
Not all courts agree. CAL. GOV'T. CODE §3304(b) (requires some type of hearing in all cases). In
Allen, the probationary police officer was not entitled to an administrative appeal hearing since
the employer asserted termination was the result of failure to complete the probationary period.
Id.
120. See Barnes, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 505-06, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 505, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
123. See id.
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has delegated to the employer, through judicial construction of the Act,
the ability to preclude due process protections.
The Act may be viewed as protective of the probationary employee's
dignitary interest in being afforded the opportunity to participate in
the governmental decision-making process. Failure to require the
employer to inform the probationary employee of the nature and
grounds for termination renders participation meaningless, however,
and the Act constitutionally insufficient.' 24 Under Ramirez,
• .. the extent to which due process relief will be available depends
on a careful and clearly articulated balancing of the interests at stake.
• . . In some instances this balancing may counsel formal hearing
procedures that include the rights of confrontation and cross-
examination, as well as a limited right to an attorney.... In others,
due process may require only that the administrative agency comply
with the statutory limitations on its authority.'
Regardless of the procedures the Legislature considers necessary, every
statutory scheme must be analyzed under Ramirez for constitutional
sufficiency. Only through explicit recognition of the probationer's
dignitary interest can due process values be protected when the state
decides whether and to what extent procedures are to be followed
when probationary employees are terminated.' 26
The problems associated with probationary employment and the
property interest, such as the ability of the state to nullify due pro-
cess protections, do not always arise when the probationary employee
is terminated. The probationary employee is not limited to asserting
an impact upon a due process property interest.'27 Apart from the
effect that recognition of the California dignitary interest has upon
procedural requirements, a probationary employee may still demand
due process protections because of his fourteenth amendment liberty
interests.' 21 Consistent with the current approach to the property in-
terest in continued employment, however, liberty interests arising under
the fourteenth amendment have serious limitations.'2 9
124. The possibility exists that informing the probationary employee of the nature and grounds
for the adverse employment action is a prerequisite to make the hearing itself constitutionally
sufficient. See supra notes 54-69 and accompanying text. Without knowledge of why the employer
acted, the probationer has an intolerable burden to surmount in his attempt to present a mean-
ingful explanation before the responsible government official. Cf. Kuhn v. C.A.B., 183 F.2d
839, 841-43 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
125. See Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d at 269, 599 P.2d at 628, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
126. See id.
127. See infra notes 130-92 and accompanying text.
128. See infra notes 130-52 and accompanying text.
129. See infra notes 153-92 and accompanying text.
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B. The Liberty Interest
Job termination may impact upon more than an employee's due
process property interests. Specific action by the government has been
recognized as implicating an employee's fourteenth amendment liberty
interests. 3 ' In the context of employment, suppression of liberty in-
terests may occur when termination is based on charges of miscon-
duct that stigmatize the employee's reputation or seriously impair his
opportunity to earn a living.I3 In contrast, with the due process prop-
erty interest in continued employment, the source of "employment
liberty interests" arises by implication from the United States
Constitution.'32 The extent to which liberty interests are recognized
in the context of employment is helpful to a probationary employee
seeking redress from arbitrary governmental action. Without the ad-
ditional recognition of the probationer's dignitary interest, however,
the benefits arising from the current construction of fourteenth amend-
ment liberty are limited.
1. Stigmatization
Stigmatization occurs when the actions of the government detract
from an individual's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity.'33
No constitutional basis exists, however, for converting every defamatory
statement by a governmental official into a deprivation of due pro-
cess liberty. 3 Even though governmental defamation may have a
drastic effect, freedom from stigmatization of reputation alone is not
recognized as within due process liberty.'3 5 Along with an individual's
reputation, some more tangible "interests" must be effected. 3 6 When
stigmatization occurs in the course of employment termination, even
though the individual is a probationary employee, a deprivation of
liberty may result.'37 The employment action does not have to be as
onerous as termination to constitute a more "tangible interest."' 38
130. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 571. In the context of employment, the substance of "liberty"
is not the elemental freedom from bodily restraint. Instead, the interest implicated is derived
from ". . .the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupa-
tions of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, to establish a home and bring up children
.., and generally enjoy those privileges long recognized.., as essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness by free men." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
131. See Lubey v. City and County of San Francisco, 98 Cal. App. 3d 340, 346, 159 Cal.
Rptr. 440, 443-44 (1979).
132. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 571-74.
133. See id. at 573-74.
134. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701-13 (1976).
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id.
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Any alteration of the employee's employment status is sufficient when
combined with the injury resulting from stigmatization, whether altera-
tion takes the form of termination or merely transfer of assignment.13 9
Serious limitations exist, however, on the availability and effec-
tiveness of asserting that the governmental action has had an adverse
impact on the employee's liberty interest through stigmatization of
reputation. Primarily, before due process affords the employee an
opportunity to refute the employer's stigmatizing charge, the employee
must assert some factual dispute relating to the circumstances giving
rise to the charge.'40 The rationale underlying the requirement of a
factual dispute is to afford the procedures some meaning other than the
satisfaction of mere formalities.'" Predicating due process protections
on the requirement of a factual dispute, however, underscores the
limited effectiveness of an assertion of stigmatization.
A finding of factual dispute will prevent the courts from rendering
due process protections inapplicable.' 42 Even when the probationary
employee has the ability to challenge the substantive truth of the
material in question, the procedural protections exist solely to pro-
vide the employee with a chance to clear his name.'4 3 A subsequent
determination of the adequacy, or even the existence of the employer's
reasons for termination, is not considered to raise constitutional
concerns.' 44 Since the probationary employee is viewed as having no
property interest in continued employment, the purpose of judicial
review is solely to ascertain whether false and defamatory impres-
sions relating to the employment action were created.' 45
When the adverse employment action has occurred before the
probationary employee has had an opportunity to refute the properly
139. See id. at 708-09; see also Stewart v. Pearce, 484 F.2d 1031 (1973). In Stewart, an
order to report for psychiatric examination and subsequent transfer of assignment implied there
existed both reasonable grounds for the order as well as mental unfitness for the job. The
implication arising from the order created a significant stigma or official branding to be invalid
absent the procedural protections of notice of the action and reasons therefore, as well as
a proper hearing. Id. at 1034.
140. See Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 627 (1977). In Codd, the employee failed to affir-
matively assert that the report on which the employment action was based was substantially
false. Without this allegation the Court, in a per curiam decision, found it unnecessary to con-
sider whether the report was of a stigmatizing nature, and if so whether the circumstances
of dissemination implicated liberty interests. Id. at 626. Compare Lubey v. City and County
of San Francisco, 98 Cal. App. 3d 340, 344, 159 Cal. Rptr. 440, 44243 (1979) (hearing re-
quired where charges denied) with Kestler v. City of Los Angeles, 81 Cal. App. 3d 62, 66,
146 Cal. Rptr. 61, 63 (1978). "If he does not challenge the substantial truth of the material
in questions, no hearing. . . ." Id.
141. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
142. See Codd, 429 U.S. at 627-29.
143. See id.
144. See Lubey, 98 Cal. App. 3d at 349, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 44546.
145. See id.
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disputed charges, the employee must be reinstated to his previous
position. "I To further protect the employee's abused due process rights,
evaluations during the remaining probationary period must be made
without consideration of the proceedings or related findings which
preceded the prior employment action." 7
As a remedy, the right to reinstatement is of qualified benefit to
the probationary employee. After reinstatement, the employer is in
no way precluded from "properly" inquiring into the employee's
qualifications and taking subsequent action to terminate the position." '4
Since the employer has the ability to act upon ". . . subtle matters
of character and judgment . . . , 9 subsequent disciplinary action
may occur even though based on improper grounds. Because termina-
tion is not recognized as impacting upon a probationary employee's
property interest, as long as the employer acts in a manner to preclude
public disclosure of the reasons for discharge, the probationer's due
process challenge will be rejected.'
The limitations of due process liberty under the fourteenth amend-
ment as applied in the context of governmental employment, have
been consistently applied to California governmental employees. 5' To
effectuate the dignitary interest values, the probationary employee's
interest in being treated with respect and dignity must be applied to
termination based on charges of misconduct that operate to stigmatize
the probationer's reputation. 152 When situations involving stigmatiza-
tion are analyzed under the dignitary interest rationale, the current
due process requirements are modified not only in the manner of ap-
plication, but also in the breadth of application.
2. Stigmatization and the Dignitary Interest
As the United States Supreme Court has stated, mere stigmatiza-
tion of an individual, whether by branding him disloyal or otherwise,
is insufficient to invoke the procedural guarantees of due process ab-
sent a more tangible interest such as loss of governmental
employment.' 53 To constitute a more "tangible" interest, apart from
those arising from the Bill of Rights or other constitutional sources,
the interest must have been initially recognized and protected by state
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
150. See Lubey, 98 Cal. App. 3d at 346 n.2, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 444 n.2.
151. See id.
152. See infra notes 153-92 and accompanying text.
153. See Paul, 424 U.S. at 706.
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law.'1 4 Once created, alteration or extinguishment of the interest is
sufficient to invoke the procedural guarantees contained in the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution.' Under the ra-
tionale of the United States Supreme Court, due process protections
are not required each time the state in its capacity as an employer
might be considered responsible for a statement defaming a proba-
tionary employee who continued to remain employed.' s6 When analyz-
ing under Ramirez, the result changes.
Under Ramirez, the probationary employee's dignitary interest in
fair and unprejudiced decision-making is operative anytime the
employee is subjected to deprivatory governmental action.' Since
charges of misconduct are generally accumulated by the employer,
protection of the probationary employee's dignitary interest should
not be predicated on the formal instigation of termination. Not all
charges of misconduct are subject to immediate disciplinary action
or are objectively provable. Complaints against the probationary
employee, whether or not substantiated, may be registered over a period
of time. All charges are entered into "evidence" in the employer's
evaluation during the probationary employee's "trial" period.' 5 Ab-
sent timely notice of the charges as they occur, the probationary
employee is unduly hindered in any attempt to establish a rebuttal
based on information obtainable when the alleged incidents were fresh
in the minds of the participants or spectators. 9 The probationary
employee should be informed of all charges and complaints when made
or included in his personnel file. Since the employer needs only to
notify the probationer of the addition to his personnel file and allow
the probationer access to the file, the burden on the employer would
be negligible.
Informing the probationary employee of the charges as they occur
154. See id. at 710.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See supra notes 50-61 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. This is merely a part of the employer's
considered right and power to weigh not only proven acts of misconduct, but also those subtle
matters involving more than objective provable acts. Id.
159. See LILly, AN INTRODUCTION To THE LAW OF EviDENCE 79-83, 231-34 (1978). The
time between filing of a complaint and a hearing on the subsequent employment action may
be extensive. When a witness evidences an inability to remember, his memory may be revived
through the production of a document intended to induce recollection. Alternatively, when
the witness's memory cannot be revived satisfactorily by an earlier writing, authorized or pre-
viously verified by the witness, the writing may in many cases be offered in lieu of his present
testimony. The ability of the probationer to utilize either of the aforementioned evidentiary
procedures is, however, predicated on the witness's ability to testify that he made or adopted
the document when the matter was fresh in his memory. Id.
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and affording the probationer a chance to attach an opposing or clari-
fying statement, will effectuate the dignitary interest in California. 60
The probationary employee's ability to contest the allegations not only
will prevent arbitrary governmental action, but will secure the proba-
tioner's sense of meaningful participation. Since the goals of the
dignitary interest constitute the "tangible" interest required by the
United States Supreme Court,' 6' both federal and California due pro-
cess protections are triggered whenever stigmatizing charges are leveled
by the governmental employer. 62 Apart from the question of whether
stigmatizing charges alone are sufficient to implicate due process pro-
tections, however, the courts have required an inquiry into the truth
of the charges.' 63 Without a determination that the charges are false
as well as defamatory, the question of the procedures required does
not arise. 6 "
3. Requirement of Refutation
Originally, mere instigation of charges against an employee that
might damage the employee's standing and associations in the com-
munity, when coupled with adverse employment action, would require
imposition of the essential elements of due process protections: notice
and an opportunity to be heard. 65 The United States Supreme court has
departed substantially from this original position.'66 In Codd v.
Velger,' 67 due process was construed to require a hearing only if the
impression created by the employer in connection with the probationer's
termination was false as well as defamatory. 61 California courts con-
sistently have followed the standard articulated in Codd. 69
The underlying rationale for affording a probationary employee an
opportunity to refute the charges of misconduct is to provide the
employee with a chance to clear his name.'I" The courts have held that
the only way the desired result can be achieved is by challenging the
160. See supra notes 50-61 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 133-93 and accompanying text.
162. See id.
163. See infra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
164. Id.
165. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 573. Whether the charges involve allegations such as dishonesty
or immorality is inconsequential as long as the individual's good name, reputation, honor or
integrity is at stake because of the actions of the government. Id. In Roth, the court found
no suggestion of such an occurrence. Id. at 573.
166. See Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977).
167. See id.
168. See id. at 627-28.
169. See Lubey, 98 Cal. App. 3d at 346, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 443-44.
170. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 573 n.12.
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truth of the charges. 17' The current judicial position fails to
acknowledge that termination is part of the stigmatization against
which the employee is entitled to defend. 72 Not only can the release
of unfavorable, although perhaps true, information injure the
employee's reputation, but the determination that the employee is unfit
also can create a significant stigmatization. 173 The employer can still
terminate the employee if subsequently determined to be "unfit." ''
74
By allowing the probationary employee an opportunity to tender an
explanation or contest the adequacy of the grounds for termination,
however, the employee's personnel record can reflect the viewpoints
of both the employee and the employer. Since a more complete record
will allow subsequent employers to examine a record balanced between
employer and probationer, a stigmatization resulting from termina-
tion could be substantially reduced.
Further considerations, apart from the impact upon the employee's
reputation, are involved when the employee is refused a chance to ex-
plain the circumstances surrounding an otherwise undisputed incident.'"7
The probationary employee is precluded from establishing for the
record matters which the employer may take into consideration when
exercising the discretion to terminate. 176 Alteration of the decision-
making procedures may not alter the outcome of the employer's deci-
sion. The form of the final decision, however, is not dispositive of the
need to allow input by the probationer.1 77 Whether the goal of allow-
ing the employee to participate is to reduce stigmatization or to show
171. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
172. See id. at 587-90 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
173. See Codd, 429 U.S. at 632-34. (Stevens, J., dissenting):
The discharge itself is part of the deprivation of liberty against which the employee
is entitled to defend. Release of unfavorable information can damage an employee's
reputation and employment prospects, but far greater injury is caused by an official
determination, based on such information that the employee is unfit for public
employment.
Id. at 633 (emphasis added). But see Kestler v, 81 Cal. App. 3d at 66, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 63:
* ..the hearing required where a nontenured employee has been stigmatized in the
course of a decision to terminate his employment is solely to provide the person
an opportunity to clear his name. If he does not challenge the substantial truth of
the material in question, no hearing would afford a promise of achieving that result
for him. [If the employer has not challenged the truth of the charge] . . . that fact
would follow him no matter how many hearings he was afforded.
Id.
174. See Lubey, 98 Cal. App. 3d at 349, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 445.
175. See infra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
176. See Codd, 429 U.S. at 632-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
177. See Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d at 275, 599 P.2d at 631, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 325. The Ramirez
court found of particular importance the individual's interest in ensuring that the government
official did not base his decision on erroneous or irrelevant facts. Id. Accord Kestler 81 Cal.
App. 3d at 67-69, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 64-65. (Jefferson, J., dissenting). (Failure to take
mitigating factors into consideration, whether through refusal or advertence, is an arbitrary
and capricious method of termination.) Id.
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that the charges do not warrant discharge, the method of interaction
must take into consideration the need to engender governmental ac-
countability and the importance of recognizing the needs of the
individual."' Only by allowing the probationary employee to be a
participant along with the governmental official can these values be
significantly effectuated. " 9 Failure to afford the probationary employee
a hearing, whether or not the charges are disputed or subsequent ter-
mination is justified, is a deprivation of procedural due process rights.
The procedures, separate and distinct from the underlying substan-
tive interest in freedom from stigmatization of continued employment,
are themselves a constitutional right which the courts must protect. " '
Besides the judicially imposed requirement that the employee be
allowed to refute the charges, an assertion of due process deprivation
will be rejected when no public disclosure is made of the reasons for
termination." The "public disclosure" rule not only places a premium
on governmental secrecy, but also falls to recognize the practical dif-
ficulties that the government faces when attempting to foreclose
dissemination.
4. Disgrace Through Dissemination
In Lubey v. City and County of San Francisco,"2 various charges
of misconduct were tendered by citizens against two probationary
employees." 3 The employer investigated the charges and terminated
the employees."' The reasons for termination were communicated to
the Civil Service Commission." 5 While the confidential nature of the
probationary employees' personnel files had been retained, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that to assume overall confidentiality had
178. See Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d at 267-68, 599 P.2d at 627, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
179. See id. But cf. supra notes 93-104 and accompanying text. For the possible effect on
probationary employee's "property" interest, see also Codd, 429 U.S. at 632-36 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting): "[s]ince allowing the employee to keep his job would eliminate, or at least lessen,
the loss of liberty, due process requires that the hearing include the issue whether the facts
warrant discharge." I. at 634.
180. Specific identification of the individual's dignitary interest in making a presentation
before a responsible government official is required when determining what procedures are con-
stitutionally required. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
181. See Lubey, 98 Cal. App. 3d at 349, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 445; see also Bishop v. Wood,
426 U.S. 341 (1975). The reasons forming the basis for termination in Bishop were orally com-
municated in private to the employee. Since the communication was not made public, the Court
found the reasons could not properly form the basis for a claim of impairment of reputation.
See id. at 348.
182. 98 Cal. App. 3d 340, 159 Cal. Rptr. 440 (1979).
183. See id. at 347, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 444.
184. See id.
185. See id.
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been retained would be unrealistic.'86 The Lubey decision highlights
the practical difficulties involved in preventing dissemination, regardless
of the employer's good faith attempts to avoid public disclosure."8 7
The decision also can be interpreted as encouraging secrecy. The less
an employer investigates, creates documentation, or informs the
employee of the reasons for his actions, the greater the likelihood
that dissemination will decrease.
The employer possesses an acknowledged ability to act on his expert-
ise in deciding whether the probationary employee is competent and
should attain permanent status.' 8 An established element of the
employer's ability to terminate is his authority to so do without
justification.189 To preclude dissemination, the employer need only
discharge the employee during probationary status on the ground of
"failure to complete the probationary period." 190 In the discharged
employee's future employment applications, however, inquiry will be
made into prior employment experience and the reasons for termina-
tion. At that point, the withholding of the reasons behind the
employee's termination is of little help to the discharged employee.
Refusal to reveal the reasons behind termination carries the negative
connotation of specific, although unspecified grounds, for finding the
employee unsuitable for continued employment. In light of the prior
employer's silence in connection with termination, the employee's
subsequent explanations are rendered meaningless. 1 '
Allowing the probationary employee to include explanatory material
in his personnel file when he is informed of the specific reasons for
termination reduces the burden on the government to maintain ab-
solute secrecy regarding employment actions. While the employer may
not unreasonably disseminate the reasons for termination when no
legitimate governmental objective is involved, allowing the employee
to tender some explanation can prevent the prejudicial effect of in-
advertent disclosures made in the process of termination.192 Addition-
186. See id. The officers were not afforded notice of the charge and an opportunity to
refute the charges before their employment was terminated for misconduct. Id. at 346-47, 159
Cal. Rptr. at 444. Since the court concluded that the termination proceedings did not comport
with fourteenth amendment requirements, the officers were entitled to reinstatement and lost
salary. Id. at 347-49, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 444-45.
187. See id.
188. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
190. See Allen v. City of Napa, No. 44228 Napa County Superior Court (1982). In Allen,
three citizen complaints had been filed against the probationary employee. Since termination
was obstensibly predicated on "failure to complete the probationary period", the trial court
declined to find termination was based on misconduct. Id.
191. See supra notes 175-79 and accompanying text.
192. The employer is not, however, free to broadcast the information. A procedure in which
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ally, by removing the incentive of the government to act with secrecy, the
probationer's dignitary interest in being treated as a fully participating
and responsible member of society can be achieved.
CONCLUSION
The extent to which probationary employees enjoy due process rights
is considered a settled issue. While commentators have periodically
questioned the difference in the due process analysis between proba-
tionary and permanent employees, the standard established under the
fourteenth amendment and adopted by the California courts has not
been disturbed. This comment has re-examined the appropriateness
of denying a probationary employee the procedural due process pro-
tections of a hearing or the requirement of judicially cognizable good
cause for termination. The inquiry has become especially pertinent
in light of the California due process dignitary interest as established
by the California Supreme Court in People v. Ramirez. The Califor-
nia dignitary interest is a constitutional concept of the broadest scope
and application. In specifying the requirements of the dignitary in-
terest, the California Supreme Court made clear that applicability of
the due process safeguards is not predicated on judicial construction
of the fourteenth amendment.
This comment has demonstrated that under a dignitary interest
analysis, a probationary employee is not without procedural due pro-
cess protections. Even though the employer must be afforded broad
discretion in deciding which employees will achieve the status of per-
manent employees, that discretion must not be exercised arbitrarily. To
protect against arbitrary action, and to preserve the probationary
employee's dignitary interest, some type of hearing must occur before
termination. During the hearing, the employer must support his deci-
sion to terminate with judicially cognizable good cause. In order to
create within the probationary employee a meaningful sense of par-
ticipation and to prevent stigmatization of reputation, the probationary
employee must be given an opportunity to refute the employer's reasons
for termination.
This comment has shown how imposition of the dignitary interest
as a constitutional requirement of procedural protection will have the
effect of opening up the employer's substantive termination decision
for judicial review. In suggesting how procedural due process rights
the employee could include something as administratively unburdensome as a written addition
to the personnel file explaining the situation may render any inadvertent disclosure by the employer
de minimus. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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are effected, this author has not offered a proposal which seeks to
balance the competing interests of society and the individual. The
dignitary interest is now an established principle of California con-
stitutional law. By applying the dignitary interest to the specific set-
ting of probationary governmental employment, 93 this comment has
merely illustrated how and why the present rights of probationary
employees must be brought to the level of existing constitutional
standards.
Chris Scott Graham
193. The procedures necessary to satisfy the requirements of the due process dignitary in-
terest are not limited in application to public employment. See generally Ezekial v. Winkley,
20 Cal. 3d 267, 572 P.2d 32, 142 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1977). Under the common law right of "fair
procedure," a doctrine formulated to fill the void when due process is inapplicable for lack
of state action, private employers may be forced to reevaluate their employment practices regarding
probationary employees. Id. See also Comment, Recognizing the Employee's Interest in Con-
tinued Employment - The California Cause of Action for Unjust Dismissal, 12 PAc. L.J. 69
(1981). (application of tort principles to the context of employment termination)
